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Abstract
We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the rm based
on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of di¤erent degrees of
relationship-specicity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make
investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If relationship-
specicity is exogenously given, it turns out that joint asset ownership can
be optimal only if the degree of relationship-specicity is su¢ ciently small. If
relationship-specicity can be freely chosen and if party As investments are
more productive, then the parties deliberately choose a strictly positive level
of relationship-specicity and they always agree on sole ownership by party A.
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1 Introduction
The property rights approach to the theory of the rm (Grossman and Hart,
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) is one of the major achievements
in microeconomic research in the past three decades, as it provides a formal
framework to analyze basic questions about economic institutions such as rms
that were rst raised by Coase (1937).1 In a nutshell, given that contracts
are incomplete, a partys incentives to make relationship-specic investments
depend on the fraction of the investmentsreturns that the party can capture
in future negotiations. Asset ownership matters, because ownership improves
a partys position in the case that future negotiations fail, and hence ownership
increases the fraction of the investmentsreturns that a party will be able to
capture in the negotiations.
The standard model of the property rights approach considers a partys
investments in its human capital only (see Hart, 1995). In this case, it turns
out that joint ownership of an asset by two parties cannot be optimal. Under
joint ownership, each party has veto power over the use of the asset. Making
instead one party the sole owner of the asset improves this partys incentives
to invest in its human capital, while the other partys investment incentives
are not changed. However, Hart and Moore (1990, pp. 11321133) and Hart
(1995, pp. 6869) briey point out that joint ownership can be optimal if the
parties invest in physical capital, so that both partiesinvestments can be used
by a single asset owner, even in the case that negotiations fail. Joint ownership
1See Hart (2011) for a concise survey of the modern theory of the rm. See also Segal
and Whinston (2010) for a comprehensive review of the related literature.
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can be optimal in the presence of physical capital investments, because under
sole ownership the non-owner improves the owners bargaining position by
investing, so that under joint ownership one of the two parties has stronger
investment incentives.
In the present paper, we take a closer look at investments in physical
capital, which have been largely neglected in the literature on the property
rights approach. In particular, we analyze the impact of the investments
relationship-specicity on the optimality of joint ownership, an issue that to
the best of my knowledge has been unexplored so far.
In a rst step, we assume that the degree of relationship-specicity is ex-
ogenously given. It turns out that joint ownership can be optimal only if the
investments are not too relationship-specic. Otherwise, the party whose in-
vestments are more productive should be the owner (just as in the standard
case where investments are in human capital).
In a second step, we endogenize the degree of relationship-specicity. Sup-
pose that party As investments are more productive than party Bs invest-
ments. It turns out that if the degree of relationship-specicity can be freely
chosen, then joint ownership cannot be optimal, even when investments are
in physical capital. Instead, the parties will agree on A-ownership. Moreover,
while in case of investments in human capital the parties would prefer to com-
pletely remove any relationship-specicity, in case of investments in physical
capital the parties deliberately choose a positive level of relationship-specicity.
3
2 The model
Consider two parties, A and B. At some initial date 0, the parties agree on
an ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg. Since the parties are symmetrically
informed and there are no wealth constraints, they will agree on the ownership
structure that maximizes their anticipated total surplus, which they can divide
up-front by suitable lump-sum payments.2 For instance, party B could be the
supplier of an intermediate good, which party A may use to produce a nal
good. The owner has the control rights over the assets needed to produce
the intermediate good. A-ownership can then be interpreted as integration
and B-ownership as non-integration, while o = J means that there is joint
ownership.
At date 1, the two parties simultaneously make investments a  0 and
b  0, respectively, which are observable but not contractible. The investments
are made in the physical capital; i.e., they are embodied in the assets. Let the
partiesinvestment costs be given by c(a) = 1
2
a2 and c(b) = 1
2
b2.
At date 2, the parties negotiate about whether or not to collaborate.3 If the
parties agree on collaboration, then they together generate the date-2 surplus
a + b. The technology parameter  indicates whether party As investments
2Note that ex-ante bargaining determines only the division of the anticipated surplus,
but not its size; hence, we follow the standard property rights models by not modelling the
ex-ante negotiations explicitly.
3In an incomplete contracting framework, ex-ante it is not possible for the parties to
commit to collaborate ex-post. See Hart and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and
Tirole (1999) for discussions of the incomplete contracting paradigm.
4
are more productive (0 <  < 1) or whether party Bs investments are more
productive ( > 1).
In a rst-best world, the parties would collaborate ex-post and the total
surplus would be given by SFB = aFB + bFB   c(aFB)   c(bFB), where the
rst-best investment levels are aFB = 1 and bFB = .
In the incomplete contracting world, if the parties do not collaborate at
date 2, their payo¤s depend on the ownership structure as displayed in Table
1. First, consider A-ownership. Then in the case of disagreement party A
(who owns the necessary assets) can produce the intermediate good without
party B. Yet, in this case party A can make the prot (a + b) only, where
 2 (0; 1], while party B makes zero prot. Note that party A can make use
of party Bs investments even when the parties do not collaborate, because
the investments are in physical capital.4 However, the investments may be
relationship-specic; i.e., the returns of the investments may be strictly smaller
in the absence of party Bs human capital than in the case of collaboration.
The degree of relationship specicity is given by 1   . The larger is , the
smaller is the degree of relationship-specicity. In particular, if  = 1, then
there is no relationship-specicity at all.
Analogously, consider B-ownership. If there is disagreement, then party B
(who owns the assets) can make the prot (a+ b) by trading with someone
else, while party A makes zero prot. Finally, consider joint ownership. In
4In contrast, if the investments were in human capital, under A-ownership the disagree-
ment payo¤s would be given by a (party A) and 0 (party B), while under B-ownership
they would be given by 0 (party A) and b (party B).
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this case, each party has veto power over the use of the assets, so that both
partiesdisagreement payo¤s are zero (cf. Hart, 1995).
party A party B
o = A (a+ b) 0
o = B 0 (a+ b)
o = J 0 0
Table 1. The partiesdisagreement payo¤s at date 2.
We model the outcome of the date-2 negotiations using the Nash bargain-
ing solution.5 Hence, the parties will always collaborate and they agree on a
transfer payment such that at date 2 each party gets its disagreement payo¤
plus half of the renegotiation surplus (i.e., the additional surplus that is gener-
ated by collaboration). Hence, if there is integration (o = A), then party As
date-2 payo¤ reads
uAA(a; b) = (a+ b) +
1
2
(1  )[a+ b]
and party Bs date-2 payo¤ is given by
uAB(a; b) =
1
2
(1  )[a+ b].
If there is non-integration (o = B), then party As date 2-payo¤ is
uBA(a; b) =
1
2
(1  )[a+ b]
5See Muthoo (1999) for a comprehensive exposition of bargaining theory.
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and party Bs date-2 payo¤ reads
uBB(a; b) = (a+ b) +
1
2
(1  )[a+ b].
If there is joint ownership (o = J), then the partiesdate-2 payo¤s are given
by
uJA(a; b) =
1
2
(a+ b)
and
uJB(a; b) =
1
2
(a+ b).
3 Results
Let us now analyze the partiesinvestment incentives. Given ownership struc-
ture o 2 fA;B; Jg, at date 1 party A chooses the investment level
ao = argmaxfuoA(a; b)  c(a)g;
while B chooses the investment level
bo = argmaxfuoB(a; b)  c(b)g:
Hence, under A-ownership, the investment levels are aA = 1
2
(1 + ) and
bA = 1
2
(1  ). Under B-ownership, the investment levels are given by aB =
1
2
(1 ) and bB = 1
2
(1+). Under joint ownership, the investment levels are
aJ = 1
2
and bJ = 1
2
.
Lemma 1 The investment levels can be ranked as follows: aB < aJ < aA 
aFB and bA < bJ < bB  bFB.
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At date 0, the parties agree on the ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg that
maximizes the total surplus So = ao + bo   c(ao)   c(bo). We can now state
our main ndings. Suppose rst that the degree of relationship-specicity is
exogenously given.
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose that party As investment is more productive ( <
1). If the productivity advantage is not too strong, then joint ownership is
optimal, provided that the degree of relationship-specicity is su¢ ciently small;
i.e.,  is larger than a critical value A 2 (0; 1). Otherwise, A-ownership is
optimal.
(ii) Suppose that party Bs investment is more productive ( > 1). If
the productivity advantage is not too strong, then joint ownership is optimal,
provided that the degree of relationship-specicity is su¢ ciently small; i.e., 
is larger than a critical value B 2 (0; 1). Otherwise, B-ownership is optimal.
Proof. (i) It is straightforward to check that SA   SB = 1
2

 
1  2 > 0,
since  < 1. Hence, A-ownership is better than B-ownership. Moreover,
SJ   SA > 0 whenever  > A := 2(1   2)=(1 + 2). The critical value A
is smaller than 1 if party As productivity advantage is not too strong (i.e., if
 >
p
3=3).
(ii) Observe that SB   SA = 1
2

 
2   1 > 0, since  > 1. Thus, B-
ownership is better than A-ownership. Furthermore, SJ   SB > 0 whenever
 > B := 2(
2   1)=(1 + 2). The critical value B is smaller than 1 if party
Bs productivity advantage is not too strong (i.e., if  <
p
3). 
Proposition 1 is in line with the examples in Hart andMoore (1990, pp. 1132
1133) and Hart (1995, pp. 6869), according to which joint ownership can
8
be optimal when investments are in physical capital.6 However, the propo-
sition also shows that joint ownership can be optimal only if the degree of
relationship-specicity 1   is su¢ ciently small.
Intuitively, joint ownership can be optimal because under sole ownership
the non-ownersinvestment incentives are very small, as by investing the non-
owner improves the ownersbargaining position. Yet, when the investments
are very relationship-specic, then under sole ownership the non-owners in-
vestment has only a relatively small impact on the owners bargaining position,
so that the party whose investments are more productive should be the owner
(just as in the case of investments in human capital).
Suppose now that the degree of relationship-specicity can be endogenously
chosen.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose that party As investment is more productive ( <
1). If the degree of relationship-specicity 1   can be freely chosen, then the
parties agree on A-ownership and the optimal  is strictly smaller than 1.
(ii) Suppose that party Bs investment is more productive ( > 1). If the
degree of relationship-specicity 1    can be freely chosen, then the parties
agree on B-ownership and the optimal  is strictly smaller than 1.
6Note that regardless of the degree of relationship-specicity, joint ownership would never
be optimal if the investments were in human capital (cf. footnote 4). In this case, one can
analogously show that aA = (1 + )=2, bA = =2, aB = 1=2, bB = (1 + )=2, aJ = 1=2,
and bJ = =2. Recall that aFB = 1 and bFB = , so that there is never overinvestment.
Since the total surplus is concave, it is larger under o = A and o = B than under o = J ,
since sole ownership increases one partys investment and does not change the other partys
investment.
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Proof. (i) Recall from the proof of Proposition 1(i) that SA is larger than
SB when  < 1. It is easy to check that the total surplus SA is maximal if
 = (1   2)=(1 + 2) < 1. Given this level of , joint ownership cannot be
optimal, since SA   SJ =  1  22 =(8[1 + 2]) > 0. Hence, A-ownership is
optimal.
(ii) We already know that SB is larger than SA when  > 1. The total
surplus SB is maximal if  = (2  1)=(2+1) < 1. Given this level of , joint
ownership cannot be optimal, because SB   SJ =  2   12 =(8[2 + 1]) > 0.
Thus, B-ownership is optimal. 
Proposition 2 shows that with endogenous relationship-specicity, if a partys
investments are more productive, then ownership by this party is always op-
timal, even when investments are in physical capital. Moreover, the parties
agree on a strictly positive degree of relationship-specicity (1    > 0). In
contrast, if the investments were in human capital, as is typically assumed in
the literature on the property rights approach, the parties would clearly prefer
to remove any relationship-specicity (i.e., they would choose 1   = 0).7
Intuitively, suppose that party As investments are more productive. We
know that joint ownership may be better than A-ownership since party Bs
incentives are weaker under A-ownership (as party B improves party As bar-
gaining position by investing). Yet, compared to joint ownership, increasing
the degree of relationship-specicity under A-ownership is a better way to mit-
7If the investments were in human capital (cf. footnote 4), then both SA and SB would
be maximal when  = 1, because the owners investment incentives are increasing in , while
the non-owners incentives are independent of  (see footnote 6).
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igates the impact of party Bs investment on party As bargaining position,
since the optimal choice of  reduces party As incentives less than the choice
of joint ownership.
As an illustration, Figure 1 depicts a case in which partyAs investments are
more productive ( = 0:7). Note that if the degree of relationship-specicity
is exogenously given, than joint ownership is optimal only if  > 0:685. If
the degree of relationship-specicity can be endogenously chosen, the parties
always agree on A-ownership and choose  = 0:342.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
total surplus
l
SFB
SJ
SB
SA
Figure 1. The total surplus levels as functions of , when party
As investment is more productive ( = 0:7).
4 Conclusion
We have reconsidered the property rights approach to the theory of the rm
based on incomplete contracts. Taken together, our results show that even
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when investments are in physical capital, joint ownership may well be subop-
timal. In particular, joint ownership is generically suboptimal if the degree of
relationship-specicity can be freely chosen. Hence, when we want to explain
joint ownership arrangements which are prevalent in the real world, it seems
to be important to also consider potential reasons di¤erent from investments
in physical capital.8
8In particular, joint ownership can be optimal when the bargaining outcomes are deter-
mined by the outside-option principle (see Chiu, 1998, and De Meza and Lockwood, 1998)
or when ex-post disagreement may lead to costly conicts (Annen, 2009). Moreover, it has
been shown that joint ownership can be optimal in repeated game settings (Halonen, 2002)
or in the presence of asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2006, 2008).
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